










Navigational error accounts for half of the accidents and serious incidents in close to shore maritime                               
transport in Norway predominantly due to the rapidly changing weather conditions and the dangerous                           
nature of the narrow inshore waters found along the Norwegian coast. This creates a dependence on                               
Differential Global Positioning System (DGPS) use and any disruption to this service can lead to an                               
increased accident rate. The aim of this paper is to research the jamming vulnerability of existing                               
maritime receivers and to understand if an upgrade to a multi­constellation or multi­frequency receiver                           
would improve system resilience. The novelty of this work is a comparison of jamming resilience                             
between different combinations of multiple constellations (GPS and ​Globalnaya Navigatsionnaya                   
Sputnikovaya Sistema (​GLONASS)) and multi­frequency Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS)                   
signals. This paper presents results from GNSS jamming trials conducted in the northern part of                             
Norway, confirming previous research and indicating that typical maritime GPS receivers are easy to                           
jam and may produce erroneous positional information. Results demonstrate that the single frequency                         
multi­constellation receivers offer better jamming resilience than multi­frequency (L1 + L2) GPS                       
receivers. Further, the GLONASS constellation demonstrated a better resilience than GPS. Results                       
demonstrate a known correlation between GPS L1 and L2 frequency, as well as a probable                             
over­dependence on GPS for signal acquisition, meaning that no signal can be received without GPS                             
L1 present. With these limitations in mind, the authors suggest that most the economic update to the                                 
single frequency GPS receivers, currently used for maritime applications, should be                     











1. INTRODUCTION. Navigational error accounts for half the accidents and serious incidents                       
in maritime transportation worldwide (DNV, 2013). These have increased significantly since                     
the introduction of the Global Positioning System (GPS) and Electronic Chart Display and                         
Information Systems (ECDIS) on most ships (1995­2002). While there is no direct evidence                         
linking this directly with GPS and ECDIS, previous research (Boyes, 2014; Grant et al.,                           
2010) has suggested that navigators’ over reliance on GPS could be a cause. 
Modern ships are highly automated, able to run with little human interaction with the                             
ship’s networked navigational and operational systems. Whilst they are extremely                   
convenient, these features make them exceedingly vulnerable to cyber­attacks, including                   
 spoofing or the jamming of a ship’s GPS system (CCICADA, 2015). The same document                           
states that nowhere is the necessity of building greater resilience more apparent than in the                             
large, modern ship. 
Similar trends can be seen in Norwegian waters (Naevestad et al., 2014). Statistics do not                               
specify the cause of the accidents that occur, but it is generally assumed that the main factors                                 
are the increase in foreign vessel traffic, the rapidly changing weather conditions, the                         
dangerous nature of the narrow inshore waters, and the over­dependence on GPS in those                           
conditions, which can lead to a false feeling of security. Any foreign flagged vessels                           
exceeding 70 metres, or 50 metres if carrying hazardous or polluting cargo, need compulsory                           
pilotage to pass through inshore water fairways (fjords). The compulsory pilotage                     
requirement can be met by either employing a pilot or a navigator holding a Pilot Exemption                               
Certificate ­ a theoretical and practical examination which includes knowledge of the waters                         
and visual and radar navigation (The Norwegian Coastal Administration, 2016). Even with                       
this experience, navigation is difficult and pilots tend to rely on GPS.  
To address GPS accuracy in the fjords, the Norwegian Coastal Administration has                         
established a network of 12 Differential GPS (DGPS) stations along the Norwegian coast.                         
Each DGPS station (​de facto reference station) calculates corrections using pseudorange                     
measurements, which are then transmitted in the 283.5 kHz – 315 kHz frequency band, and                             
can be received by vessels equipped with a DGPS radio beacon. The stated planar accuracy                             
of the system, within the coverage area, is better than 10 metres (2 drms) and in reality an                                   
accuracy of 1­3 metres is expected (The Norwegian Coastal Administration, 2014). Use of                         
DGPS is therefore crucial for high accuracy navigation in the demanding and narrow                         
Norwegian straits.  
Volpe (2001) raised awareness of GPS vulnerability to intentional and unintentional                       
interference. Since then a number of studies have addressed this, using GNSS simulators                         
(Borio et al., 2013; Mitch et al., 2011; Kuusniemi et al., 2012) or outdoor GPS jamming tests                                 
(in South Africa and Germany) (Niekerk and Combrinck, 2012; Bauernfeind et al., 2011).                         
The findings from these studies indicate that the combination of highly sensitive GPS                         
receivers and the low signal strength of spaceborne GPS makes this navigation technology                         
very vulnerable to jamming. The General Lighthouse Authorities of the United Kingdom and                         
Ireland have also run a number of jammer trials close to the English shore (Grant et al.,                                 
2010). Apart from intentional jamming, DGPS signals can also be disrupted by interference                         
from other radio transmitters (unintentional jamming) and are limited in fjord areas, where                         
the signals must pass over high terrain. 
Currently, typical marine grade receivers are differential GPS L1 receivers (Grant et al.,                           
2010), most of which were installed several years ago and which will eventually need to be                               
upgraded. With the decreasing cost of modern hardware, these are likely to be                         
multi­constellation or even multi­frequency ones. The aim of this paper is to research                         
jamming vulnerability of the existing maritime receivers and to suggest the best update                         
option. This leads to the following research question: Do multi constellation/multi frequency                       
GNSS receivers offer any additional jamming resilience over the current GPS L1 or                         
GLONASS G1 receivers? 
This paper focuses on civilian traffic navigating close to the Norwegian shore, at the high                               
northern latitudes, and using Norwegian Coastal Administration DGPS stations. To this end,                       
dedicated jamming trials, addressing those conditions, have been conducted in the northern                       
part of Norway, within the Polar Circle, identified as one of the more problematic areas. 
The novelty of this work is a comparison of jamming resilience between different                         
combinations of multi constellation (American GPS and Russian GLONASS) and                   
 multi­frequency GNSS signals. Previous research has not addressed the usability of                     
additional frequencies (L1, L2, G1, G2) or additional constellations for jamming resilience,                       
especially at those latitudes. 
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses the nature of radio frequency                             
interference, Section 3 describes the trials conducted and shows a comparison of the modern                           
GNSS receiver used in the trials with the existing maritime receivers. Section 4 then                           
discusses positioning accuracy and compares the jamming results between multiple                   
frequencies (L1, L2, G1, G2) and constellations (American GPS and Russian GLONASS),                       




2. RADIO FREQUENCY INTERFERENCE ON THE GNSS SIGNAL (JAMMING).                 
Generally, multi­constellation DGPS receivers increase position reliability not the accuracy.                   
For this a standard approach is to use multiple frequencies and a carrier­based solution (such                             
as Real Time Kinematic (RTK)). The latter is more expensive, due to front­end complexity                           
and proprietary algorithms needed to decode the GPS L2 signal. Hence the current industry                           
standard is an increase in constellations not frequencies.  
A typical jammer operates very close to GPS L1 central frequency. Figure 1 shows the                               
frequency allocations for GPS (L1 and L2) and GLONASS (G1 and G2). The comparison                           
graph also shows the modernised GLONASS G3 and GPS L5 bands, as well as the one used                                 
by the Galileo constellation. The primary frequencies, G1 and L1, are situated close to each                             








Radio Frequency Interference (RFI) caused by the jammer can be pulsed or continuous.                           
Continuous RFI can be classified by its bandwidth and is usually differentiated into                         
broadband or narrowband (Kaplan and Hegarty, 2006). This classification is relative to the                         
GNSS band, and implies that a broadband RFI will have a bandwidth equal to, or greater than                                 
 the GNSS band (2 MHz for the GPS Coarse/Acquisition (C/A)­code on L1) while the                           
narrowband RFI will have a bandwidth narrower than GNSS. 
Jones (2011) plotted theoretical values for different Continuous Wave (CW) broadband                       
jammers, with power from 10 mW to 1 kW, which are shown in Figure 2. Jammer­to­signal                               
ratio (J/S), which is dependent on the spatial separation between receiver and interference,                         
determines the amount of interference that receivers can handle and still be able to acquire or                               
track the GNSS signal. Horizontal dashed lines show some typical receiver thresholds,                       







Mitch et al. (2011) tested 18 of the current, commercially available, handheld civilian                           
GNSS jammers with regards to signal properties. Most of the jammers in this research                           
transmit signals with bandwidths exceeding the 2 MHz civilian GPS C/A signals, and some                           
of them have a bandwidth exceeding the 20 MHz P(Y) signal. The majority of the jamming                               
signals were generated by frequency modulation of a CW signal with some sort of swept tone                               





Each sweep is for 9 microseconds and covers a range of about 14 MHz, which includes                                 
the civilian L1 band. The central frequency is the red horizontal line where the power was                               
measured at 22 mW. 
Carrier­to­noise power density ratio Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) (signal strength) is the                           
fundamental parameter for defining signal quality at the receiver (Hofmann­Wellenhof,                   
2008). SNR is defined as the bandwidth­independent index number, relating the carrier power                         
to noise per 1 Hz bandwidth, which is expressed in dB­Hz. 
Bauernfeind et al. (2011), used the Galileo open­field Test Range in Germany to research                             
the change in carrier­to noise (C/N​0​) of the GNSS signal, while jammed by widely available                             
low­cost GNSS jammers, transmitting a chirp signal with a bandwidth of 11.8 MHz in the L1                               






Figure 4 shows the results from the multi­frequency Ipex software GNSS receiver, as the                             
distance to jammer changes. The blue line in Figure 4 shows the recorded SNR degradation                             
 versus the theoretical curve (the red line). The measured curves follow the theoretical curves                           
as long as the front end is not saturated with received jammer power, as is noticeable above                                 
the noise floor. 
These results suggest that a typical jammer operates very close to GPS L1 central                             




3. TRIAL DESCRIPTION. As discussed in the introduction, the trial’s aim was to simulate                           
civilian vessels using the Norwegian Coastal Administration DGPS stations and to expose                       
them to jamming while navigating the inshore Norwegian waters at the high northern                         
latitudes. To conduct these trials, jamming permission was obtained from the Norwegian                       
Communications Authority, on the condition that no other vessels were closer than 3                         
kilometres to the jamming site and that no fog, heavy snow or rain shower causing poor                               
visibility was present. 
To make a comparison between different constellation and frequency combinations                     
possible, a survey grade Leica GS10 GNSS receiver had to be used to collect the data. This is                                   
a much more modern receiver than the maritime receivers currently used and a pre­trial                           
comparison was organised to compare the performance of both type of receivers. On board a                             
Furuno GP90 GPS receiver and s Leica GS10 GNSS receiver were connected to a maritime                             
Furuno GPS only antenna using a GPS splitter ­ this way, both receivers used the GPS                               
constellation only for positioning. An additional, modern, low cost GPS+GLONASS single                     
frequency Garmin eTrex20 was used and placed close to the antenna. All three receivers were                             
placed on board a static vessel with a jammer slowly approaching on a smaller boat. Figure 5                                 
shows the trajectory of a naturally drifting vessel, as recorded by three receivers. The Furuno                             
receiver, which is more visibly sensitive to jamming, started to provide significant misleading                         
information when the jammer power was weak, which was at a distance of 1600 metres in                               
this trial. Both the Leica and Garmin receivers maintained similar positional accuracy (at a                           
level of a few metres) until the distance to the jammer was 800 metres. Here the behaviour                                 
differed, with the Leica stopping National Marine Electronics Association (NMEA) output                     







Results from this pre­trial demonstrate that maritime navigation receivers are more                       
sensitive to jamming than Leica receivers. The fact that results obtained with the Leica GS10                             
receiver are likely to show a better performance (better resistance to jamming) than                         
multi­constellation maritime receivers, should be borne in mind as data is interpreted. 
The actual trial was conducted with the Leica GS10 using the Leica GNSS AS10 antenna,                               
which was placed on the shore with the jammer moving towards or away from the receiver on                                 
a small boat. The aim of the trial was to quantify the jamming effect, simulating a vessel’s                                 
approach to a narrow inshore strait. The reverse of the setup (a moving jammer and static                               
receiver) was used as a means of maintaining the repeatability of the experiment, as any                             
vessel used would naturally drift away. 
The jammer broadcasted interference centred at the L1 carrier frequency (1575.42 MHz)                         
with a bandwidth of 60MHz F0 and an average power of 0.33 mW. This affected both the                                 
GPS L1 and the GLONASS G1 frequencies. The jamming power was constant during the                           
trial, and the interference strength was varied by the distance between the small boat and the                               
shore (Figure 6). 
The jammer was turned on 2200 metres from the GNSS receiver and the boat approached                               
the GNSS receiver with a constant speed of 7 m/s until the distance was 50 metres from the                                   
receiver. The boat remained static for about 20 seconds and then moved away, to a distance                               
of 1300 metres from the receiver had been reached. Then, the jammer was turned off. This                               
test was repeated three times. The observed distance at which a particular type of receiver                             







Figure 7 shows the satellites’ skyplot for the duration of the trials. The blue letter G                                 
denotes the GPS satellites and the red letter R denotes the GLONASS satellites. At high                             
latitudes GLONASS offers better coverage than GPS constellations. The dark grey area to the                           
east indicates the direction of the jammer. 
Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) has been suggested as a jamming indicator in Section 2.                               
Figure 8 demonstrates this concept. The distance to the jammer is marked with a black line                               
and the following satellites’ SNR are compared: one high (G25) and four low elevation GPS                             
satellites. Those are: G10 in the direction of the jammer (E), G14 in the opposite direction                               
(W) and with G20 and G23 to the north. The first trial went from A to D, the second from E                                         
to F, the third from G to H and the last trial started at I. The jammer was turned off between                                         
each trial (as indicated by gaps in the black line). It is possible to notice a similarity with                                   
Figure 4. 
As the jammer was turned on (A) at a distance of 2200 metres from the receiver, we can                                     
see a clear dip in the SNR values from all satellites. Larger fluctuations in the SNR appeared                                 
at a distance of 1300 metres (point B), and SNR started to drop (point C), with low lying                                   
satellites losing signal first. Further, the low satellites re­acquired the signal more quickly,                         
irrespective of the direction to the jammer. The jammer was turned off at a distance of 1300                                 
metres (point D). During the second (E­F) and third (G­H) trial patterns are not visible as                               
G14 rose above 20º and both G10 and G23 are no longer tracked (elevation below 10º). The                                 
high elevation G25 now maintains signal for longer and re­acquires it quicker than any other                             
satellite. This might suggest that, in a jamming environment, a noisy signal coming from a                             











Figure 9 shows a similar comparison for the GPS satellite G25 and the GLONASS                             
satellite R10. These are the satellites with the highest elevation (65 – 72º) throughout the test                               
and were close to each other in a southern direction as shown in Figure 7. 
Both satellites had similar initial SNR values, around 50, with visible fluctuations in SNR                             
when the jammer was turned on. G25 SNR started to drop earlier than R10, with G25                               
acquisition lost at 31 SNR while R10 acquisition was at 28 SNR (when jammer reached 50                               
metres). Reacquisition for R19 occurred earlier as well. The pattern was repeated for each of                             
the trials. 
Figure 10 compares the SNR values of two low elevation (30º) satellites (G04 and R02).                               











Throughout the jamming test, GLONASS G1 performed better than GPS L1, both in                           
terms of SNR values and in terms of the later loss of acquisition and earlier reacquisition of                                 
the GLONASS satellites. This resilience is most likely due to the GLONASS code being half                             
the length of the GPS one (the narrower front­end passband) and the use of slightly different                               
frequencies by each GLONASS satellite (Vladislav et al., 2013). 
The test also showed that during the acquisition phase, the receiver was more susceptible                             
to interference than in the tracking phase, i.e. there is 5­10 dBm difference in the SNR at                                 
which the signal is lost and at which the signal is recovered (see Figures 10­12). This applies                                 
to both the the GPS and GLONASS signals, and it is mainly because the bandwidths of the                                 
tracking loops have to be higher during acquisition, as the Doppler shift is not known                             
precisely enough (Bauernfeind et al., 2011). When the receiver is in the tracking phase, the                             
code and the carrier tracking loops are already locked on to the signals. Such conditions make                               
jamming harder, since greater power is required to unlock these loops. 
 
4. MULTI­FREQUENCY AND MULTI­CONSTELLATION POSITIONING       
ACCURACY. Currently, the majority of maritime receivers are differential GPS using L1                       
 frequency. A number of offshore vessels, including support vessels to oil installations,                       
drillships and rigs, needing increased positional accuracy and confidence and will utilise                       
differential GPS L1 and GLONASS G1 receivers. All vessels are expected to use Norwegian                           
Coastal Administration differential GPS stations, which currently transmit GPS corrections                   
only. For a full picture we will also demonstrate the GLONASS and GPS+GLONASS DGPS                           
solutions. 
Figure 11 demonstrates the jamming effect for the L1 DGPS position used by the vessels.                               
Blue indicates the differential GPS L1 position, red, the differential GLONASS G1 position                         
and green, the combined position. Planar separation is calculated as the difference within the                           
position reported by the static rover, with the mean of the position calculated using the first                               
15 minutes of non­jammed data. 
In the case of GPS, the jamming effect agreed with that found in the pre­trials discussed in                                   
previous sections (Figure 5), as well as with the SNR analysis. Interestingly, while the                           






The combined GPS+GLONASS solution outperformed both of the previously described                     
solutions, apart from a single instance (at 322150 s). No single frequency solution is available                             
if SNR falls below the 30dBm threshold (translating to approximately 50 metres distance                         






A comparison with a dual frequency differential solution (Figure 12) shows that only the                             
GLONASS accuracy has improved. The GPS results only improve at around 322040 and                         
323400 s. A combined GPS+GLONASS solution benefits from the improved GLONASS                     







Figure 13 shows the Horizontal Dilution Of the Precision (HDOP) values for the trial                             
duration. These are only related to the geometry and the number of visible satellites. The                             
SNR values (shown in Figure 8­10) are based on the correlator performance and can be a                               
good proxy for the relative pseudorange accuracy. While pseudorange accuracy is likely to                         
decrease with jamming, the main reason for positional outage is a rapid loss of satellite                             




5. JAMMER EFFECT ON MULTIPLE FREQUENCIES. While the frequency of the                   
jammer used in the trial overlaps only GPS L1 and GLONASS G1 frequencies (as shown in                               
Figure 1), the dual frequency results in Figure 12 suggest that GPS L2 frequencies are                             
affected by jamming as well. Currently, GPS uses a military only P(Y) code on L2, which is                                 
 unavailable to civilian users. In order to decode it, a squaring of L1 and L2 signals is used,                                   
which leads to 6dB loss and L2 acquisition dependent on L1 acquisition (Vladislav et al.,                             
2013).  
This can be observed in Figure 14 where all of the L1 and L2 SNR patterns look very                                     
similar and the loss of lock and reacquisition occurs at the same time, despite the GPS L2                                 
band being 300 MHz lower than the  frequency band of the jammer. 
In the case of GLONASS, both the G1 and G2 codes are known and can be decoded                                   
separately, as indicated by different patterns between G1 and G2 SNR (Figure 15). The wavy                             
pattern on the G2 frequency belongs to the lowest GLONASS satellite (R09, elevation 24 to                             
10º). 
This can be further demonstrated by plotting the correlation between the two frequencies                           
of GPS and GLONASS. To make sure that we only visualised the jamming effect, we limited                               
our analysis to satellites with an elevation above 20º. Figure 16 shows the correlation, with                             











 These results show the difference between GPS and GLONASS, with a visibly stronger                           
correlation between the GPS frequencies. The GLONASS results demonstrate big separations                     
between G1 and G2, indicating sudden drop of SNR when close to the jammer. 
Currently, the GPS constellation is undergoing modernisation, which includes an                     
additional frequency (L5) and a civilian (open) code on the L2 frequency. Only a limited                             
number of satellites offer this signal now (block IIR­M or younger) and one of them (PRN                               
25) was visible during the trial. Figure 17 shows the SNR from all frequencies (L1, L2, L5),                                 
demonstrating the difference between the L2 and L5 SNR patterns, in all but the duration of                               
the signal gaps. As discussed in Section 5, GLONASS demonstrated later loss of acquisition                           
and an earlier reacquisition. 
These results suggest that a multi­frequency GNSS receiver offers additional protection                       













6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION. Differential GPS (DGPS) is critical for close to shore                         
navigation in the northern North Sea. This paper has demonstrated that the maritime GPS                           
receivers currently in use are affected even by low power jammers, widely available on the                             
market. Results have shown a detectable jamming effect when 1600 metres away from a                           
jammer and a visible effect on positional accuracy 500­1000 metres away. Observed outages                         
of up to 10 metres (Figure 5, 11 and 12) are very hazardous, considering the narrow nature of                                   
the Norwegian straits, which are frequently affected by weather and poor visibility. The                         
modern receiver tested demonstrated stronger resilience, with position reported erroneously                   
(on few metres level) only briefly before losing the position very close to the jammer (50­100                               
metres). As the trial was limited to only two receivers, it is not possible to generalise these                                 
values, and they should only be considered as an approximation. More in­depth testing is                           
required to better understand these results. 
Throughout the experiment, the GLONASS G1 frequency remained more resistant to                       
jamming than GPS L1, though it was more affected by intermittent jamming. This could be                             
due to the narrower front­end pass band of the the GLONASS receiver (Vladislav et al.,                             
2013). A combination of both systems demonstrated better positional accuracy and jamming                       
resilience. This has been traced back, not only to the increased number of satellites used, but                               
also to the higher elevation and better coverage of the GLONASS satellites (Figure 13).                           
Combining both systems is definitely advantageous. 
The use of dual frequencies showed a very small increase in GPS accuracy while                             
GLONASS visibly benefited. This has been traced to a correlation between the GPS L1 and                             
L2 frequencies. In all cases, the loss of all signals was correlated with loss of the last GPS                                   
satellite. This is different from the front end saturation observed by Bauernfeind et al. (2011)                             
as no sudden drop in SNR was present for the GLONASS G2 and GPS L5 frequencies. This                                 
might indicate the receiver’s hardware overdependence on the GPS signal, but further tests                         
are required for proof of this. 
Based on these results, in the case of the updating of maritime receivers, the authors                               
suggest considering an upgrade to a GPS+GLONASS receiver instead of a dual frequency                         
GPS receiver. Should further upgrade be possible, it is worth considering a dual frequency                           
GLONASS update over a GPS one. In this instance it is also possible to detect jamming by                                 
comparing G1 and G2 SNR. 
 The GPS constellation is currently undergoing modernisation, which includes an                     
additional civilian frequency (L5) and an open L2C code on an L2 frequency. Currently, only                             
a limited number of satellites offer these signals (block IIR­M or younger). Data observed                           
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